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implement such a recommendation.
While a draft policy was drawn up in
2001, it has yet to be promulgated,
pending the formation of greater institutional links among various Indian
ministries with responsibilities in this
area. The Ministry of Defense was
tasked to initiate such an
interministerial coordinating body, but
so far the policy has not been formalized. Even without such a public policy,
India is moving ahead with enhancing
its maritime security in all its spheres.
ANDREW C. WINNER

Naval War College

Smith, Edward A., Jr. Effects Based Operations:
Applying Network-centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis,
and War. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program,
2002. 545pp. $20

“Effects-based operations [EBO] are coordinated sets of actions directed at
shaping the behavior of friends, foes,
and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war.”
This definition is offered in Edward
Smith’s long, tortuous study, Effects
Based Operations. Substitute the terms
“speeches by the president,” “negotiations by diplomats,” or “economic
sanctions” for “effects-based operations,” and the emptiness of this definition becomes all too evident.
The major difficulty with this work,
however, lies in the following passage:
“The very nature of military competition should make it clear that would-be
foes will attempt to exploit any warfare
niche in which they believe the United
States and its allies cannot successfully
engage. Logically, these would-be foes
will see exploitable niches wherever
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network-centric and effects-based operations are least applicable. Urban and
guerrilla warfare, counter-terrorism operations, peacekeeping efforts, and hostage rescues are just a few examples.”
With this statement, Smith has gratuitously undermined the importance and
value of effects-based operations (dragging network-centric operations along
in the process), for those “niches” constitute the shortlist of operations U.S.
military forces will be undertaking for
the foreseeable future.
This is a complex and ambitious book,
which progresses from a general discussion of EBO through chapters that
illustrate the relationship with networkcentric operations, discuss operations
in the cognitive domain, and describe
how complexity factors into the picture. Toward the end of the book an
operational example is offered before
some general conclusions are reached.
Effects-based operations, we are repeatedly reminded, focus on the mind of
man. The “effects-based strategy is conceived and executed as a direct assault
on the opponent’s will and not a byproduct of destroying his capability to
wage war.” Just what the “opponent’s
will” constitutes is not clearly addressed. Is it the will of the soldiers in
the field, the will of the civilians supporting the effort, or the will of the
leadership? The differences in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM are noteworthy.
The will of the Iraqi armed forces was
quickly broken, as they threw down
their arms and fled. But was the will of
Saddam, of the brothers Hussein, or of
the Iraqi resistance broken? How can
one confidently determine a change in
will, and how can one be totally sure
that the change is permanent? No
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theory is offered to help the reader understand how to break the will of
fanatics.
In a long, intricate work there are
bound to be contradictions, but when
they cut to the core of the argument,
they become disconcerting. For example, one reads: “In effects-based operations, therefore, actions and their
effects are not and cannot be isolated.
They are interrelated.” But later the author writes, “If those disproportionate
effects are to shape behavior in the direction we want, however, we must figure out first how to trace the path of an
action to a certain effect, and then how
to plan the right actions to set the chain
in motion.”
None of this means that effects-based
operations should not be pursued—
only that Smith does not have it quite
right. Better, one should think carefully
about EBO in terms of objectives. Rear
Admiral Henry Eccles provided in these
pages over twenty years ago the key insight in this regard: “The objectives represent ‘the effect desired,’ what one is
seeking to achieve by the use of military
force.” Eccles guides one to the recognition that the selection of objectives provides the desired effect—hence the basis
for effects-based warfare. Of course,
one can select objectives for which the
effects either are monumentally difficult to achieve or can never be clearly
determined. To change the will of, say,
Osama Bin Laden falls squarely in this
latter category.
Unfortunately, the publisher of this
book did not do Smith or his readers any
favor by printing the text in a sans-serif
font in a fully justified format. There is
a reason why books and newspapers use
serif fonts—“kerning” of letters and
words makes them significantly easier
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to read in small type sizes. The book
also lacks an index, which makes finding items quite a feat, and the footnotes
do not correlate with the text.
Effects Based Operations is presented in
the first person plural. Employment of
the first person plural has two serious
drawbacks—consistency and advocacy.
On some pages “we” takes on at least
three separate meanings—U.S. decision
makers, the author himself, and the author and his reader. In other places
“we” appears to refer to the U.S. Navy,
and elsewhere to U.S. military forces.
This proves rather confusing for the
reader, who is continually challenged to
discern to whom the author is referring.
Use of the first person, moreover, gives
this book the tang of an in-house, partisan staff study rather than a dispassionate analysis.
Finally, the bibliography is thin, omitting such important works as General
David Deptula’s Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare
(Aerospace Education Foundation,
2001) and Paul Davis’s Effects-Based
Operations (EBO): A Grand Challenge
for the Analytical Community (RAND,
2001).
All in all, this book was a disappointment, weighed down by its length, its
complexity, and its many flaws.
ROGER W. BARNETT

Professor Emeritus
Naval War College

Voorhees, James. Dialogue Sustained: The Multilevel Peace Process and the Dartmouth Conference.
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2002. 470pp. $24.95
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